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THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT AS A SMALL
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: AN ARGUMENT AGAINST
THE HOLDING IN GUERNSEY v. RICH PLAN
Steven Naclerio*
In an unusual decision, a United States district court has
recently held that dissatisfied consumers may bring suit for compensatory and injunctive relief under section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act' in instances where the Federal Trade
Commission has previously imposed sanctions against the sales
practice at issue. If allowed to stand, this decision should exercise
a profound influence upon trade regulation practice in this country. Since there is neither explicit statutory nor decisional authority for private enforcement of the Trade Commission Act, the
court relied upon a rule of statutory construction known as the
doctrine of implication to fashion the right. The rationale for the
decision arguably supports much broader protection than that
actually conferred; its reasoning should, therefore, be carefully
explored to determine both its correctness and its scope.
In Guernsey v. Rich Plan,2 plaintiffs brought a class action
alleging twelve violations of federal and state laws in connection
with their purchase of a food and freezer service agreement. It
appears that the agreement provided that, in consideration for an
initial payment of $499 and a contract for regular purchases,
defendants promised to provide groceries at stated prices and
guaranteed maintenance for those purchasers who also obtained
a freezer from the organization. A companion agreement offered
an additional twenty-dollar-per-person bounty for each customer who could tender new membership. Plaintiffs, contending
the plan was worthless, sought to'invoke provisions of the Fede* A.B., Colgate University, 1968; J.D., Duke University, 1971. Member, New York

Bar.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V 1975) provides, in pertinent part:
Unfair methods of competition unlawful; prevention by Commission.
(a) Declaration of unlawfulness; power to prohibit unfair practices.
(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.
(2) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce.
2. 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
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ral Trade Commission Act,' the Sherman Act,' the Securities
Act of 1933, 5 the Truth in Lending Act,' and six state laws regarding fraud, misrepresentation and violations of the Indiana
Deceptive Sales Practices Act.7 Their prodigious complaint was
met by a motion to dismiss based upon the absence of subject
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action, and a
request that the court abstain from resolving the controversy inasmuch as the grievance involved primarily state law.
Ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court decided (1) to
sustain jurisdiction over the counts alleging violations of the
Federal Truth in Lending Act and the Indiana state laws, (2) to
dismiss the allegations involving violations of the Sherman Act
and of the Securities Act of 1933 and, most notably, (3) to assume
jurisdiction over the private cause of action alleging unfair trade
practices in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The
district court's rationale for assuming jurisdiction over the alleged violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act rested upon
a pro forma analysis of the Act as one which regulates commerce
or protects trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies. The novel cause of action was created by invoking the doctrine of implication and reasoning that it would apply since the
plaintiffs were part of the class the Act was designed to protect
and the statute's purposes would be effectuated if they succeeded
in achieving judgment. The court acknowledged that no federal
court has held that a "private action could be implied from the
Federal Trade Commission Act."' The primary basis for the
Guernsey holding, however, emerges from the criticism which has
been visited upon the Federal Trade Commission for failing to
deter consumer fraud. Citing a series of law review articles, 9 one
example of unusually protracted litigation,'" and the Nader Re3. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970).

4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-33 (1970).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (a) (1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681(t) (1970).
7. IND. CODE ANN. § 19-15-103 (Bums 1972).
8.Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 586 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
9. Eckhard, Consumer Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 663 (1970); Engman, New
Consumer Standards,40 INs. COUNSEL J. 524 (1973); Gard, Purpose and Promise Unfulfilled: A Different View of PrivateEnforcement Underthe FederalTrade Commission Act,
70 Nw. U.L. REV. 274 (1975); White, FTC: Wrong Agency for the Job of Adjudication, 61
A.B.A.J. 1242 (1975); Comment, FTC Rulemaking v. Private Enforcement, 69 Nw. U.L.
REv. 462 (1974).
10. Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 269 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1959). See, e.g., CBS v. FTC,
414 F.2d 974 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1969); Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v.
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port on the Federal Trade Commission,I the Guernsey court condemned the agency's efforts in policing the marketplace.
The court's more restrictive holding was reached by referring
to a Commission consent decree, 2 which was agreed to by defendant's parent and which prohibited nearly identical trade practices to those pleaded. According to the court, this evidenced a
unity of interest between the plaintiff and the Commission's
"expert judgment." All doubts concerning potential damage to
federal and state regulatory structures by allowing private actions
were resolved in favor of increased consumer protection. Finally,
the Guernsey court curiously noted that because the Commission
has created a multitude of precedents through the years of its
existence, "[b]oth businessmen and courts should have no trou3
ble determining the precise structure of the Act.'
The court has thus decided that (1) district courts have jurisdiction to construe substantively the Federal Trade Commission
Act; (2) the doctrine of implication should be invoked to grant
new federal consumer rights in spite of recent Supreme Court
opinions limiting such rights in other instances;' 4 (3) it is appropriate for article Ill courts to assume regulatory jurisdiction when
they become suspicious of an agency's efficiency; and (4) no
insurmountable problems arise from situations where any disappointed consumer may sue in federal court, individually or as a
class representative, to demand construction of alleged false advertisements or other deceptive practices.
As demonstrated below, each of the foregoing conclusions
does mischief and will likely create greater problems than now
exist for the administration of such claims. Besides its relevance
to those who may be called to prosecute or defend the multitude
El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
11. E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULTZ, THE NADER REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969).
12. Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 588 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
13. Id. This finding highlights the broad implications of the court's decision. If only
concerned with the right of a consumer to enter federal court to enforce prior Commission
orders, there should normally be no consideration given to defining the acts which exceed
statutory mandates since these are normally determined in the Commission proceeding
and delineated in its order. Commission decrees generally encompass broad proscriptions
which proceed far beyond the actual practices found, or alleged, to be deceptive. Such
decrees are often criticized by past respondents who claim that the decrees can be unintentionally violated or that they bear no relation to the case that was tried. See, e.g.. ITT
Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976); National Dynamics Corp. v.
FTC, 492 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974).
14. E.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
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ot private suits which may arise under section 5, the decision is
of general interest since its rationale supports a variety of new
rights at both the state and federal level.'"
JURISDICTION

Title 28, section 1337,16 confers original jurisdiction upon federal district courts to hear disputes "arising under any Act of
Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade or commerce
against restraints and monopolies" without regard to the amount
in controversy. This broad grant of jurisdictional authority'7 is

particularly attractive to disaffected consumers because most can
be "made whole" by sums far more modest than the $10,000
jurisdictional amount required to sustain jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question)'8 or 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(diversity).19

Federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and
must look to Congress for evidence of their authority to adjudicate."0 In this respect, the Constitution gives inferior courts capacity to take jurisdiction, but an act of Congress is required to
confer it as either limited, concurrent or exclusive. 2' Supplement-

ing express statutory grants of jurisdiction are court-created doctrines such as pendent jurisdiction which confer jurisdiction on

the federal courts and are said to aid in the efficiency with which
claims are adjudicated by allowing the consolidation of state and

federal claims in a single forum.2" While many statutes which
regulate commerce expressly confer jurisdiction upon the district
court,2 others are silent. In the instance of such a "silent act,"
jurisdictional questions may be decided either by looking to the
15. E.g., Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4374 (Supp. V 1975).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970).
17. See, e.g., Sosa v. Fite, 465 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1972); Murphy v. Colonial Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
20. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301 (1966); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260
U.S. 226 (1922).
21. 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.60[2], at 605 (2d ed. 1975).
22. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933); Strachman v. Palmer, 177 F.2d 427 (1st Cir.
1949). See also I J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTiCE 0.6011], at 602 (2d ed. 1975); Note,
Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285, 289
(1963).
23. See, e.g., The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
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act's provisions to determine whether the act can be classified as
one which regulates commerce, or by determining whether Congress intended to deny jurisdiction to the district courts by conferring it elsewhere. This type of analysis appears particularly
appropriate since in one instance a court is obliged to assume
jurisdiction if it views the statute as merely regulating commerce
while in the other it could find that Congress nowhere intended
to confer jurisdiction in the district court and could decline to
24
entertain the matter.

Recent decisions on the jurisdictional issue have discussed
the matter in a variety of ways. For example, in Holloway v.
Bristol-Myers Corp. ,25 the court assumed jurisdiction under section 1337 on the ground that the pleading was not plainly insubstantial or frivolous, but it refused to imply a private right under
27
2
the Federal Trade Commission Act. In Carlson v. Coca Cola,
however, the majority dismissed the case for lack of section 1337
jurisdiction because precedents had established that there was no
"colorable right to a remedy under the particular federal stat' The most recent Supreme Court decisions in the area29 do
ute."28
not clearly address the issue. In National Railroad Passenger
Corp. v. National Association of RailroadPassengers (Amtrak),3 0
for example, the district court dismissed the action and held that
plaintiff lacked standing to sue. The District of Columbia Circuit
reversed and held that plaintiff had both standing and an implied
cause of action.3 The jurisdictional issue was finessed in the Supreme Court:
The issue has been variously stated to be whether the Amtrak
Act can be read to create a private right of action to enforce
24. Breathing life into the jurisdictional inquiry is also appropriate in light of the

complex excursions into legislative history necessitated by the Supreme Court's cause of
action criteria. See text accompanying note 32 infra.
25. 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973). This analysis was followed by the district court in
Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
26. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 998 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
27. 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973).
28. Id. at 280. One commentator has characterized the jurisdictional versus the
cause-of-action inquiry as "largely formal." Note, 77 HARV. L. REV.,supra note 22, at 289.
29. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453
(1974). See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975);
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
30. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
31. Potomac Passengers Ass'n v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir.
1973), reu'd sub nom. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453 (1974).
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compliance with its provisions; whether a federal district court
has jurisdiction under the terms of the Act to entertain such a
suit; and whether the respondent has standing to bring such a
suit. . . .But, however phrased, the threshold question clearly
is whether the Amtrak Act or any other provision of law creates
a cause of action whereby a private party such as the respondent
can enforce duties and obligations imposed by the Act; for it is
only if such a right of action exists that we need consider
whether the respondent had standing to bring the action and
whether the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain it.3"
Finding no cause of action, the majority found it unnecessary to
consider the jurisdictional issue. The dissent concurred on this
point since it believed that, in this context, issues of "right of
action," "standing" or "jurisdiction" were "only a matter of semantics."3 3
The easy analysis employed by courts to assume federal jurisdiction over implied rights cases is derived from Justice Black's
opinion in Bell v. Hood,3" which held that novel questions thought
to arise under the Constitution should not be dismissed prior to
a determination of the complaint's sufficiency. This, of course,
means that any decision to dismiss is, in effect, a decision on the
merits. In this context, Bell virtually eliminates an inquiry into
the limited jurisdiction of the district court. And, as the dissent
noted, in those instances where the sufficiency of the federal
cause of action is not determined at the outset, related state court
claims may nevertheless find a federal forum. 5
Whatever the merits of Bell in its specific context,3" it is clear
that in that case the Supreme Court dealt with law routinely
construed by the courts. An implied claim under the Trade Commission Act could, until recently, be readily distinguished from
32. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
455-56 (1974).
33. Id. at 467. Most commentators argue that a court should assume jurisdiction over
any implied claim which in any way relates to an act regulating commerce. See Gard,
supra note 9; Note, PrivateJudicialRemedies For False and Misleading Advertising, 25

SYRAcusE L. REV. 747 (1974); Note, A Private Right of Action Under Section Five of tle
FederalTrade Commission Act, 22 HASTINGs L.J. 1268 (1971); Comment, FTC Rulemaking v. Private Enforcement, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 462 (1974). See also H.R. REP. No. 1107,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), for an indication of congressional concern over burdens imposed by expanded § 1337 consumer jurisdiction.
34. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
35. Id. at 686.
36. The action involved the propriety of an implied right for damages from one who
deprived plaintiff of fourth and fifth amendment rights. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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the type of claims raised in Bell, since the government does not
litigate its cease and desist orders in district court. Rather, the
Federal Trade Commission is expected to proceed before itself 7
with exclusive jurisdiction vested within the several circuit courts
to affirm, modify or set aside Commission orders.38 It cannot be
said, however, that the district court has no role in enforcement.
The Federal Trade Commission Act does provide for several
housekeeping chores to be performed by the courts in aid of Commission proceedings,39 and it also confers jurisdiction on the district courts to adjudicate penalty suits brought by the Attorney
General or the Commission itself.40 Moreover, the most recent
amendments to the Act 4' give the district courts several new functions. Of particular interest is the authority given to the Commission to enforce, in district court, violations of cease and desist
orders against persons who are not bound by the order itself. In
these instances, the party to be charged must have committed a
knowing violation of the Act, as interpreted and as provided by
section 45(m)(2):
If the cease and desist order establishing that the act or
practice is unfair or deceptive was not issued against the defendant in a civil penalty action under paragraph (1)(B) the issues
of fact42 in such action against such defendant shall be tried de
novo.

The foregoing language gives jurisdiction to the district court
during the penalty proceeding to construe section 5 to determine
if the allegedly unfair practice actually violates its proscriptions.
This substantive jurisdiction is altogether novel as, in the past,
penalty suit defendants were not heard to controvert anew
whether their practices violated the Act.43
Arguably, then, in the Guernsey situation one can find evidence of a congressional grant of jurisdiction for district court
adjudication after the Commission has made its determination
37. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (b) (1970).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (c), (d) (1970).
39. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1970) gives the power to district courts to enforce Commis-

sion subpoenas. The Commission may also seek preliminary injunctive relief in the district
courts. See 15 U.S.C. § 53 (1970). See also FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (1963).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1) (Supp. V 1975).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (m) (Supp. V 1975).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (m)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
43. See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); United States v. H.M.
Prince Textiles, 262 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 212
F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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that the practice violates section 5. However, in the area to which
the Guernsey decision is likely to be expanded (i.e., actions to
recover damages under section 5 when the Commission has not
acted), it would seem improper to adjudicate such disputes without further evidence of Congressional delegation. The statutory
forerunners of 28 U.S.C. § 133711 precede the enactment of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, yet one searches the
Congressional Record in vain for any connection with those
Acts. 5 While the court in Guernsey was probably correct in assuming jurisdiction, its section 1337 analysis would give courts
jurisdiction to examine a wider range of complaints than Congress intended. Because the Commission cannot come into district court seeking novel constructions of section 5,11 it would
seem anomalous for the private litigant to be in a better position
than the government to recover damages.
THE IMPLICATION OF PRIVATE RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 5

The district court in Guernsey measured the merit of plaintiffs' claim for an implied right under two expressed standards:
whether "(1) the provision violated was designed to protect a
class of persons including the plaintiffs from the harm of which
the plaintiffs complain," and whether "(2) it is appropriate in
light of the statute's purposes to afford plaintiffs the remedy
sought."47 The Supreme Court's most recent teaching on implicit
private remedies, Cort v. Ash," however, details four criteria
thought to be prerequisites to the activation of the doctrine.
These criteria can be summarized as follows:
(1) The plaintiff must be a class member for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted;
(2) There ought be some indication of a legislative intent, implicit or explicit, either to create such a remedy or deny it;
(3) The implicit right should be consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislation; and
44. E.g., 36 Stat. 1091 (1911); 38 Stat. 219 (1913).
45. By analogy, when the Commerce Court (created by the Interstate Commerce
Commission Act of 1887) was abolished, Congress specifically transferred jurisdiction to
the several district courts. 38 Stat. 219 (1913).
46. At least one former staff attorney has argued that Congress ought to amend the
Act so that cease and desist determinations would be made in district court. White, 61
A.B.A.J. 1242, 1245 (1975).
47. Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 586 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
48. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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(4) The cause of action should not be one which has been
traditionally relegated to state law."
The Cort opinion relied heavily on two other recent decisions,
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of
Railroad Passengers (Amtrack)0 and Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,51 both of which denied federal rights. In
Amtrak, the Court refused to imply a private right of action in
favor of dissatisfied passengers who sought to prevent a line abandonment. Clear statutory language granting rights to the Attorney General and to those dissatisfied with labor agreements was
held to be exclusive. The Court also deferred to the judgment of
the administrators who opposed private action, as well as to those
elements of the legislative history which demonstrated that private causes of action for individual passengers were specifically
rejected by Congress.52
In Barbour a receiver unsuccessfully sought to invoke a private right under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970
(SIPA),5 3 which was created to provide a special type of bankruptcy procedure for insolvent securities dealers. The Court recognized that SIPA's primary purpose was the protection of investors; however, that did not mean that every investor was entitled
to bring his own lawsuit. Rather, it found that express statutory
provision establishing one form of administrative proceeding ordinarily would limit relief to that which could be granted in such
proceeding. The Court, however, citing Amtrak, noted that
"[t]hat implication would yield . . .to 'clear contrary evidence

of legislative intent.'
(1)

)54

The Especial Class
The Supreme Court's recent analysis in Cort v. Ash" of the

49. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). It should be noted that the Cort opinion
nowhere authorized judicial intervention in instances where a court may discover lethargy
or incompetence in administrative bodies. In fairness to the district court, its opinion
reflected other aspects of the Supreme Court's criteria, albeit without specific reference
to the Cort opinion.
50. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
51. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
52. Cf. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 1001 n.69 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa to 78111 (1970).
54. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 419 (1975). Barbour
and Cort were cited as controlling authority in a memorandum opinion reversing a Seventh Circuit decision on implied rights. University of Chicago v. McDaniel, 423 U.S. 810,
rev'g mem. 512 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975).
55. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). This element is said to derive from Texas & Pac. Ry. v.
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especial class criterion seems particularly appropriate for the
Guernsey situation since the class which the Federal Trade
Commission Act seeks to protect includes every-or virtually
every-resident of the country. In Cort,5" for example, the Third
Circuit, applying criteria similar to those used by the Guernsey
court, held that a private cause of action could be inferred for
either injunctive or compensatory relief. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' determination on several grounds,
one of which was that a criminal statute, enacted for the protection of society as a whole, cannot serve as a foundation for inferences of private rights.57 The Supreme Court did not care to exclude every prayer for implied rights based upon criminal statutes." It did, however, express its belief that a criminal statute
should be "sufficiently protective of some special group so as to
give rise to a private cause of action by a member of that group."5"
On the basis of Cort, it seems apparent that the law requires
something more than a general statutory proscription enacted for
the benefit of the citizenry before a private right of action would
be appropriate. While penalty provisions of the Federal Trade
Commission Act provide the government with a potential means
of securing civil relief, the "special" group protected encompasses
every national consumer and business interest. Therefore, to infer
a private right of action from section 5 would create a federal
remedy for every victim of a commercial tort.
Besides the number of potential claims created by categorizing all consumers as a special class, the range of potentially cognizable claims makes class treatment inappropriate."0 There is no
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), acknowledged to be the first case in which the Supreme Court
had implied private rights from a federal regulatory statute. See Note, 77 HARV. L. REv.
285, supra note 22.

56. Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974). In Ash v. Cort, plaintiff shareholder's
suit for compensatory and punitive damages for director-approved political advertising
was based upon a "bare" criminal statute prohibiting corporate contributions in federal
elections.
57. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
58. In this respect, the Court left standing its holdings in Wyandotte Transp. Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); and Texas
& Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
59. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 80 (1975). Commentators have argued because one
general purpose of the 1938 Wheeler-Lea amendments was consumer protection, it necessarily follows that their numbers deserve "class" treatment. See, e.g., Gard, supra note
9, at 279. Such analysis seems to intertwine criteria (1) and (3) without properly recognizing either the special group caveat or the recognition of all relevant purposes for the
legislation.
60. There would be no jurisdictional minimum for such suits. See text accompanying
note 16 supra.
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doubt, for example, that consumer harm can result from a variety
of practices, including the use of misleading advertising for lowpriced, short-lived products and the use of other fraudulent sales
practices.' Injury from some deceptive sales claims can be
"remedied," for example, by a consumer's refusing to invest
sixty-nine cents when the product needs to be replenished, but
other deceptive claims leave purchasers with long-term
installment purchase obligations.12 Some deceptive practices are
discoverable almost immediately, while others may never be detected. 3 Additionally, some claims might be deceptively misleading to only the very credulous while other claims may deceive the
great majority of consumers. It seems error to hold, therefore, that
the Federal Trade Commission Act protects some special class
since such an interpretation would create private rights of action
for consumers complaining of a wide variety of evils-a group
which cannot be combined into a homogeneous class. It would
appear that section 5 is more aptly analogized to those bare
criminal statutes which do not serve as the basis for implied
causes of action.
(2)

The Legislative Intent
Whether one can find an indication in the legislative history
of the Federal Trade Commission Act either to create or to deny
a private right of action has been extensively analyzed." In
61. Compare Bristol-Myers Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 20,900 (FTC 1975), where the Commission refused to remand a decision to its
administrative law judge because (1) no health or safety considerations were present, (2)
the advertisements did not appeal to a particularly vulnerable group, (3) there was no
significant economic harm done, (4) the advertisements were discontinued, (5) there was
no evidence of competitive harm, (6) nor intentional wrongdoing, with Ford Motor Co.;
J. Walter Thompson Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,621
(FTC 1974), where respondents consented to abandon certain advertising which claimed
that the steel guard rails in the side doors of Ford LTD and Galaxie automobiles were as
strong as a typical highway guard rail and Chrysler Corp. and Ford Motor Co., [19731976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,671 (FTC 1974), where respondent
GM consented to abstain from making deceptive fuel economy claims for any of its
automobiles and from disparaging competing automobiles on this basis.
62. See generally Interview with Joan Z. Bernstein, Acting Director of FTC's Consumer Bureau, reported in 38 FTC REPORTS A-5 (Mar. 8, 1976).
63. The Analgesic complaints, Bristol-Myers Corp.; American Home Prods. Corp.;
Sterling Drug Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,263 (FTC
1973), now nearing initial hearing in the Commission, afford ready examples. The claim
"twice as fast as aspirin" could never be objectively determined by a consumer, particularly if the speed is measured in seconds. A companion claim-"contains the pain reliever
doctors prescribe most"-can be easily understood by reading the product label.
64. See, e.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Gard,

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1977

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 4

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 5, 1977]

Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.,"5 for example, the court compared the legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission Act
with the provisions of the Clayton Act 66 of the same Congress, and
concluded that Congress intended the Trade Commission Act to
be a unique statute which established a specialized agency to
take preemptive action against monopolistic practices and restraints of trade. Because the language of section 5 was left in the
broadest terms, no monetary or penal sanctions were imposed for
initial violations. The Holloway court also found that the 1938
Wheeler-Lea amendments to the Federal Trade Commission
Act 7 offered a remedy for problems associated with finding adverse competitive impact as a prerequisite to enforcement. While
these amendments evidenced an intention to further the protection afforded consumers, administration of the additional powers
was deliberately given to the Commission. Congress did nothing
to alter the Supreme Court's earlier holding in Moore v. New
York Cotton Exchange" that private parties could not enforce the

Act. 9 From all of the foregoing, the District of Columbia Circuit
supra note 9; Note, 22 HASTNGS L.J. 1268, supra note 33; Comment, 69 Nw. U.L. REV.
462, supra note 9; Note, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 747, supra note 33.
That branch of the test which looks for specific evidence of a denial of private rights
would appear irrelevant to the 1914 legislative history since the decision in Texas & Pac.
Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), was written two years after the statute was enacted.
65. 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
66. The Clayton Act provides in pertinent part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found
or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
67. See C. DUNN, WHEELFR-LEA AcT-A STATEMENT OF ITS LEGiSLATIVE RECORD (1938).
68. 270 U.S. 593 (1926). The legislative history of the most recent amendments to the
Act disclose an intention to reverse FTC v. Bunte Bros. Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941), and to
expand the Commission's jurisdiction to matters affecting interstate commerce. H.R. REP.
No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7702 (1974). The Moore decision has not yet received congressional disapproval.
69. The Guernsey court criticized the Moore opinion because the Supreme Court did
little to explain what it no doubt perceived to be an obvious conclusion. The lower court
spoke more clearly on the issue:
It is plain that the bill cannot be maintained under the Federal Trade
Commission Act of 1914. . . . That act declares that unfair methods of competition in commerce are unlawful and the Commission is empowered to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations, with certain exceptions, from using such
methods of competition. But as the only relief that act provides is before the
Federal Trade Commission, it affords no support whatever for the bill now
before us.
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in Holloway concluded that "Congress intended enforcement of
the Wheeler-Lea Amendments to rest wholly and exclusively with
the Federal Trade Commission, following the pattern laid down
in the 1914 Act.

' 70

Those commentators who argue for federal implied rights
seem to have adopted a view of the legislative history which is
overly sympathetic to consumer interests. An article by Stephen
Gard in Northwestern University Law Review,7 for example,
quotes a passage from the House Report on the Wheeler-Lea Act
which states that these amendments were intended to make the
consumer of equal concern with the injured competitor.7 2 To put
the statement to which Gard alludes in context, however, requires
reading the paragraphs of the House Report which immediately
precede it (which state an intention to reverse the holding in FTC
v. Raladam Co."3 limiting FTC jurisdiction to "methods of com-

petition in commerce'') in conjuction with the sentences surrounding the Gard quotation, which speak of Commission power
and procedure:
By the proposed amendment to section 5, the Commission can
prevent such acts or practices which injuriously affect the general public as well as those which are unfair to competitors.
This amendment will also enable the Commission to act more
expeditiously and save time and money now required to show
actual competition and the injurious effect thereon of the unfair
methods in question. 5
While Gard draws an inference from his excerpt that a federal
common law of consumer protection was perhaps contemplated,
an equally plausible interpretation of the statement might be
that Congress attempted only to remove an impediment to ComMoore v. New York Cotton Exch., 296 F. 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1923).
70. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986,997 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See C. DUNN,
supra note 67.
71. Gard, supra note 9, at 288.
72. H.R. REP. No. 1615, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937). "[Tlhis amendment makes
the consumer, who may be injured by an unfair trade practice, of equal concern, before
the law, with the merchant or manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest
competitor." Gard, supra note 9, at 288. See also C. DUNN, supra note 67, at 167.
73. 283 U.S. 643 (1931). See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
74. FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 646 (1931). See H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937); C. DUNN, supra note 67, at 167.
75. H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).
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mission jurisdiction and further sought to facilitate the Commission's proceedings.
A Comment in Northwestern University Law Review,7" on
the other hand, has chosen to review a portion of the original
congressional debate which quotes Senator Newlands as stating:
[Tihis particular method of enforcing that law through the
operation of a commission is applied only to corporations.
I imagine the method of enforcing that law against individuals
or firms would be an action for damages or perhaps by a suit in
equity for an injunction, but there the individual having a complaint against an individual or a firm would have to institute the
action himself and pay the costs of the proceedings."
From these casual remarks the author deduced that a private
party could "seek redress on his own if he were willing to bear the
expense. ' 78 Undoubtedly he could, through a common law action
for fraud or unfair competition. Moreover, with regard to
situations similar to Guernsey where a prior decree is in evidence,
the same author quotes congressional remarks which seek to distinguish between violations committed by the well-intentioned
businessmen and those afflicted with moral turpitude." However
well reasoned the distinction, the congressional majority nevertheless rejected it and gave the Commission only the authority to
issue cease and desist orders. Penalty provisions were enacted in
1938, increased to $10,000 per violation in 1973,80 and broadened
in 1975 to apply to knowing violations."' While Congress has repeatedly recognized the problems posed by the intentionally deceptive trader, it has not seen fit to deter such action by allowing
federal consumer suits. Therefore, one can disagree readily with
the Northwestern author's conclusion that, based upon an
"equivocal" legislative history, "Congress expected private reme'82
dies to exist in at least some cases.
It is also apparent that the sixty-third Congress delineated
specific federal roles for the aggrieved consumer-the right to
76. Comment, FTC Rulemaking v. Private Enforcement, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 462
(1974).

77. Id. at 472. The distinction between corporations and individuals or partnerships
was not carried forward in the version of § 5 which was enacted.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id. at 471-72.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1) (Supp. V 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 45 (m) (Supp. V 1975).
Comment, 69 Nw. U.L. EV., supra note 9, at 471.
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petition the Commission for the issuance of a complaint and the
right to intervene in proceedings for good cause shown."3 Those
who would opt for more vigorous action were left with the alternative of state court litigation inasmuch as nothing in the Act was
ever thought to preempt available remedies. The language which
grants these rights has never been amended.
The district court in Guernsey dismissed all of the above,
reasoning that while it cannot be doubted that the Commission
was empowered to enforce the Act, Congress never explicitly
stated that a consumer could not sue; rather, according to
Guernsey, the congressional debates were only concerned with
what the Commission could or could not do. 4 This conclusion,
however, appears ingenuous; one can cite a number of historical
situations where, although Congress did not specifically exclude
a particular class from enforcement responsibilities, no private
suits have been allowed. For example, there appears to be nothing
in the history of the 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act" which can be said to preclude consumer suits; this
is not because Congress intended to leave open the possibility but
rather because it may have seemed obvious to all that private
enforcement was not in order.86
For those who would agree with the Guernsey court that the
legislative history is ambivalent, a review of the early decisions
recounting the history of the Act appears to rebut any implication
of private relief. A leading decision, FTC v. Gratz,7 was the first
Supreme Court opinion to construe section 5. While the majority
in Gratz upheld the lower court decision vacating a Commission
order on the theory that the administrative complaint was not
properly drawn, Justice Brandeis favored the bar with a reasoned
dissent in which he explained the genesis of the Act. The Brandeis opinion seems particularly helpful in understanding the legislative history since section 5 was originally "said to have been
urged by Mr. Brandeis and to have been approved by the President." 8
83. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (b) (1971) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, §
5, 38 Stat. 717).
84. Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 588 (1976).
85. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-359 (1970).
86. See Florida ex rel. Broward County v. Eli Lilly & Co., 329 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla.
1971), and cases cited therein for judicial rejection of private causes of action arising under
the FDA statute. For the legislative history of the 1962 amendments, see The Drug
Amendments of 1962 (compiled by the Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n).
87. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
88. W. THORNTON, COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE 1055 (1928).
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In that opinion, Brandeis disagreed with those who believed
that courts could properly review the sufficiency of an administrative pleading, particularly if it conformed to standards set by
the Interstate Commerce Commission, the acknowledged model
for the Trade Commission. For present purposes, however, Brandeis' more important contribution lies in his explication of the
history of the Act and the type of adjudication it sought to promote:
The proceeding is not punitive. The complaint is not made with
a view to subjecting the respondents to any form of punishment.
It is not remedial. The complaint is not filed with a view to
affording compensation for any injury alleged to have resulted
from the matter charged, nor with a view to protecting individuals from any such injury in the future. The proceeding is strictly
a preventive measure taken in the interest of the general public.89
Brandeis believed that Congress had created an administrative novelty in the Commission and that it sought to build upon
a system whereby competitive conditions were presumably restored through court adjudication." Because there was a feeling
of general dissatisfaction with existing statutes, Congress passed
the Clayton Act to effectuate the remedies provided by the Sherman Act and the Trade Commission Act to create an administrative tribunal to regulate competition. This resort to administrative, as opposed to judicial, regulation was one of three ways in
which the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act differed from previous methods designed to deal with restraints
and monopolies. Another innovative concept involved sanctioning anticipatory administrative action against incipient restraints rather than requiring the use of traditional measures such
as compensatory or injunctive relief. As Brandeis explained,
"[T]he act undertook to preserve competition through supervisory action of the Commission. .

. Its purpose in respect to

restraints of trade was prevention of diseased business conditions,
not cure.""1
A third remarkable aspect of the legislation was that the
initial definition of opprobrious acts was left to the agency, the
Federal Trade Commission.12 This flexibility was deemed neces89. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 432 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

90. Id.
91. Id. at 435.
92. "Recognizing that the question whether a method of competitive practice was
I
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sary to protect the public from novel anticompetitive practices
and to protect businessmen from suffering unjust hardships
which might result if practices deemed anti-competitive in one
industry were innocuous elsewhere. The grant to the Federal
Trade Commission of the right to exercise administrative discretion in defining unfair methods of competition paralleled a similar grant of power to the Interstate Commerce Commission to
93
declare preferences or advantages unreasonable.
Several other early decisions discussed the origin of the
Trade Commission Act and its uniquely constructed section 5.94
No decisions, however, found a Congressional intent to create
private rights under the Act.9" As discussed in Holloway v.
Bristol-Myers Corp.9" and elsewhere,97 the Wheeler-Lea amendments sought to protect against consumer fraud. Again, however,
one searches the Congressional Record in vain for any specific
statement favoring private enforcement. Given the legislative history surrounding the original enactment of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, it would be expected that strong evidence of a
congressional desire to give consumers a federal right heretofore
denied injured competitors would come forward. Nothing of this
sort emerges from the record.
Recent Supreme Court decisions cited above give vitality to
the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a principle of
statutory construction which yields only in cases where clear contrary evidence of legislative intent exists.9" The Guernsey court
unfair would ordinarily depend upon special facts, Congress imposed upon the Commis...
Id. at 437.
sion the duty of finding the facts.
93. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. FTC, 264 F. 885, 890 (2d Cir. 1923) (Manton, J.,
concurring).
94. See, e.g., L. B. Silver Co. v. FTC, 289 F. 985, 992 (6th Cir. 1923) (Denison, J.,
dissenting); Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. FTC, 264 F. 885, 889 (2d Cir. 1920) (Manton, J.,
concurring). See generally C. McFALND, JUDICL CONTROL OF THE FTC & ICC, 19201930, 39-99 (1933) (5 Harvard Studies in Administrative Law).
95. The absence of judicial findings that Congress intended to create private rights
under the Act arguably indicates that the courts drew particular significance from those
Commission proceedings which were dismissed as not having been brought in the public
interest. See, e.g., Gratz v. FTC, 253 U.S. 421 (1920); New Jersey Asbestos Co. v. FTC,
264 F. 509 (2d Cir. 1920). See also C. McFARLAND, supra note 94, at 60-61. If the private
rights were intended, one would reasonably expect judicial comment advising complainants that they could privately sue to enforce that which the government ought not pursue.
Such language, however, seems to be absent in the reported decisions. The early commentators, likewise, fail to discuss the possibility of private enforcement. See, e.g., C.
MCFARLAND, supra note 94; W. THORNTON, supra note 88.
96. 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
97. See, e.g., Gard, supra note 9, at 288.
98. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1975);
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did not apply this restrictive test. Rather, based on the theory
that the Commission was endowed with primary but not exclusive jurisdiction, it found no evidence on which to exclude a private cause of action. Its holding, therefore, appears erroneous in
this respect. In fact, one court has declined to follow the Guernsey
ruling. In Bott v. Holiday Universal, Inc.,"0 the District of Columbia District Court found the Guernsey decision to be "contrary
to the legislative history and intent of the FTC Act and subsequent amendments, as examined in the Holloway decision.,"'
Further, the Bott court felt "bound by the decision of the Court
in Holloway, not only because it is the law of this Circuit, but also
because it is the correct decision."''
(3)

The Legislative Purpose

The Guernsey court considered the third criterion enunciated in Cort v. Ash'° 2-that the implied remedy must be consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme-when
it reasoned that to give the Commission exclusive jurisdiction in
compliance procedures "would frustrate the purposes of the Act
[and] would deny consumers who were victimized by further
violations any recovery." ' 3 This argument, of course, turns the
inquiry upon its head since it assumes consumer jurisdiction.
Recovery can be said to be denied when the Commission enters
a case only if jurisdiction had previously existed and was somehow ousted by the institution of administrative proceedings.
In Amtrak,"4 Barbour'5 and Cort,'0" the underlying purpose
criterion was developed so as to exclude private enforcement. In
Amtrak the majority pointed to a legislative purpose of achieving
"economic viability" by a "paring of uneconomic routes" without
requiring resort to lengthy procedures before administrative agencies. 1 7 The Court in Amtrak believed that if private suits could
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 461
(1974).
99. 2 Trade Cas. 60,973 (D.D.C. 1976).
100. 2 Trade Cas. 69,301 (D.D.C. 1976).
101. Id.
102. 402 U.S. 66 (1975).
103. Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 588 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
104. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974).
105. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
106. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
107. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 461 (1974).
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be maintained the new legislation would only have substituted
district courts for the heretofore inefficient agencies and would
have generated additional problems by allowing multiple lawsuits and inconsistent determinations. ' In Barbour the Court
acknowledged that while SIPC's primary purpose was the protection of investors, "[i]t does not follow . . .that an implied

right of action by investors who deem themselves to be in need
of the Act's protection, is either necessary to or indeed capable
of furthering that purpose."'' 0 In fact, the majority sanctioned
SIPC's policy of abstention or deferred intervention as a means
of fostering the public's interest against precipitous action. 10 In
Cort the Court held that derivative suits for damages would not
enhance the primary congressional goal of eliminating corporate
funds from election campaigns inasmuch as directors could still
"borrow" funds and repay them at a later date."' Presumably,
the threat of criminal penalties was considered the exclusive
deterrent for this activity.
It seems clear, therefore, that the ultimate purpose test espoused by Justice Douglas in Amtrak"2 was specifically rejected
and that the Court mandated that judicial inquiry must instead
focus upon all congressional purposes sought to be furthered by
the statute at issue. Applying this latter method of analysis to the
Trade Commission Act, considerations such as the informality
and flexibility of administrative procedures and the vagueness
purposely created in section 5 would be ignored by allowing private suits seeking monetary reward for initial violations."'
Moreover, in situations where the Commission's expert judgment has taken the form of an order to cease and desist, courts
cannot ignore the importance that consent procedures have traditionally played in section 5 enforcement. Since 1961, at least 2800
consent orders have been negotiated by the Commission."' Each
108. Id. at 462-64. Justice Douglas' lone dissent, which berated the majority for its
"dedication to legalisms," charactered the congressional purpose as only "to protect the
people who ride the trains." Id. at 471 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Such interpretation,
ignoring all but the ultimate beneficiary of congressional endowment, would, no doubt,
create a private right from every statute enacted for the public welfare.
109. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421 (1975).
110. Id. at 421-24.
111. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
112. 414 U.S. 453, 471-72 (1974).
113. See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 997-99 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
114. Consent orders have been sequentially numbered since 1961. 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 24,011. The consent order issued on August 11, 1976, in Andrex Industries Corp.,
3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,188, is numbered C-2831. Thus, since 1961, at least 2800
consent orders have been negotiated by the FTC.
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of those respondents presumably relied upon precedents holding
that only the Commission could enforce its orders; the availability of private damages will undoubtedly impose greater burdens
upon the Commission as it may be forced to litigate a greater
proportion of its complaints after private parties consider the
possibility of Guernsey suits and decide to defend. It is also
possible that the Commission may have to accept narrowly drawn
consent decrees so that respondents' exposure in private litigation
would be minimized. Finally, applying the somewhat strained
Cort analysis, one might conclude that consumer fraud which
cannot be deterred by the substantial penalties available to the
Commission will not be deterred by actions for individual dam115
ages.
(4)

State Law Harmony

The final criterion enunciated in Cort-that the implied
cause of action should not be one traditionally within the ambit
of state law-was not confronted by the district court in
Guernsey. In Cort the Court attached significance to the traditional use of state law to regulate corporate government and consequently stated that there must be clear evidence of a congressional purpose to intrude into those relationships before an implied right would be recognized." ' Similarly, there is nothing in
the history of either the Trade Commission Act or its amendments that indicates an intention to vary the traditional means
of compensating misled consumers. Indeed, the Guernseys
themselves pleaded pendent claims for fraud and misrepresentation as well as for violations of Indiana's Deceptive Sales Practice Act.
Those who support private rights make much of the inadequacies of common law actions for fraud and deceit to buttress
their arguments for federal intervention.' 7 However inadequate
the common law remedies may appear, the proper readjustment
of consumer rights is more properly accomplished by state legisla115. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(l) (1976) provides for penalties of up to $10,000 for each
separate violation. The Commission often takes a broad view as to the number of violations which have occurred from a single deceptive practice. See United States v. J.B.
Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1974).
116. The Court distinguished its prior holding in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964), because, in the Court's view, congressional concern over the use of misleading
prqxy statements represented a clear exercise of federal jurisdiction.
117. Gard, supra note 9, at 278; Note, 22 HASTINGS L.J., supra note 33, at 1272-73;
Comment, 69 Nw. U.L. Rzv., supra note 9, at 476-77.
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tures or state courts. Many legislatures have moved in that direction, giving to the consumer those advantages conferred by section 5.111 While courts should be alert to the need to correct juris-

prudential gaps wrought by a federal system of government, not
every injustice warrants federal intervention. This would seem
particularly true in the area of consumer protection because that
rubric encompasses a wide variety of uneven interests.
An excellent example of the foregoing principles can be found
in the recent New York case of Star Credit Corp. v. Ingram."9 As
in Guernsey, consumers in Star Credit alleged fraudulent conduct
in the sale of a food and freezer service agreement and sought
compensatory and punitive damages. Also, as similarly alleged in
Guernsey, defendants continued their sales practices even after
an investigation by New York's Attorney General resulted in a
consent injunction against a predecessor corporation.120 On the
basis of New York precedent which extends the availability of
punitive damages to consumer fraud cases,'21 the court found that
since neither prior verdicts nor consent injunctions were effective
deterrents to consumer fraud, punitive damages were in order.
Furthermore, in assessing the appropriate award, the court rejected the notion that a "reasonable relationship" should exist
between actual and exemplary damages: "If these damages are
to be awarded to protect the public from continuation of a fraudulent consumer scheme, the damages must be taxed in an amount
which will accomplish the purpose of providing a deterrent to
improper behavior."' 2 2 Thus, by creative utilization of common
law concepts, misled consumers were able to achieve splendid
results in a lower state tribunal. Also noteworthy in this regard
is the Star Credit court's admission of evidence of prior fraudu118. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 9 (1), (3) (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4915-9 (1973). It has been noted that more than half the states have enacted statutes similar
to section 5. Comment, FTC Rulemaking v. Private Enforcement, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 462,
477 (1974).
119. 75 Misc. 2d 299, 347 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Civ. Ct. 1973). New York City's Civil Court,
having jurisdiction over claims not exceeding $10,000, is particularly suited for adjudication of consumer actions. This jurisdiction relieves the state supreme court of many cases
otherwise within its jurisdiction; there is, of course, generally no federal analogue. N.Y.
CITY Civ. CT. AcT § 202 (29A McKinney 1963).

120. Star Credit Corp. v. Ingram, 75 Misc. 2d 299, 300, 302, 347 N.Y.S.2d 651, 65354 (Civ. Ct. 1973).
121. Walker v. Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 179 N.E.2d 497 (1961). See

also Diamond v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 75 Misc. 2d 443, 347 N.Y.S.2d 907 (Civ. Ct. 1973).
122. Star Credit Corp. v. Ingram, 75 Misc. 2d 299, 302, 347 N.Y.S.2d 651, 654 (Civ.
Ct. 1973). Furthermore, the court's only announced constraint in awarding $15,000 for
punitive damages was the amount prayed for in the counterclaim.
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lent conduct and of the consent injunction on the issue.'23 If these
evidentiary rulings are followed elsewhere, the need for relaxed
substantive standards may be diminished.
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

The Supreme Court's ruling on the propriety of injunctive
relief in Cort v. Ash 24 also bears upon a similar claim by the
Guernseys. In Cort the Court recognized an intervening statute"'
which established a grievance procedure making injunctive relief
available to the government in appropriate instances. While that
statute expressly vested the Commission with primary jurisdiction,'12 the Court stated that "the statute requires that a private
complainant desiring injunctive relief against alleged future violations of § 610 must at least exhaust his statutory remedy
under
' 27
the Amendments when and if such violations occur. '
While the Guernsey court determined that prior case law
construed Trade Commission jurisdiction to be primary rather
than exclusive, the decision does not reveal whether plaintiffs
sought Commission intervention prior to filing. A requirement
that a complaint be filed with the Commission before judicial
relief was sought would have the obvious public benefit of drawing illicit conduct to the Commission's attention, particularly
when substantial civil recovery is also available. In instances
where preliminary injunctive relief is not necessary, it would
seem appropriate to invoke the exhaustion
doctrine to define gov28
ernmental interest in the matter.'

Comparing the analysis in Cort with that in Guernsey, it is
evident that the Supreme Court has adopted a more restrictive
view of the doctrine of implication. While the district court in
Guernsey relied on the Bivens 1 9 and Borak 30 decisions to define
plaintiffs' cause of action, the Supreme Court in Cort distin123. Star Credit Corp. v. Ingram, 75 Misc. 2d 299, 347 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Civ. Ct. 1973).
124. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
125. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-443, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974).
126. Id. at § 310 (b).
127. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 76 n.9 (1975).
128. Prior to J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 1964), the SEC argued that private
enforcement must follow an unsuccessful attempt to interest the Commission in the matter. See Phillips v. United Corp., 5 S.E.C. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). The view has since been
abandoned due to the time factors involved in proxy contests. See generally E. ARANOW
& H. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 463-67 (1968).
129. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FBI, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
130. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 126 (1964).
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guished those cases on the basis that the Bivens holding was
based upon plaintiff's clearly articulated constitutional rights
and Borak followed pervasive federal legislation directed at regulating rights and obligations between the private plaintiff and the
alleged wrongdoer.131 There is, of course, no comparable constitutional protection for consumer protection and no solid evidence
of congressional intention-by statute or otherwise-to preempt
fundamental state regulation of buyer-seller relationships. Thus,
it is entirely proper for appellate benches to follow these recent
decisions and the Holloway line of cases, which leave consumers
to traditional avenues of redress.
SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW

Lower court cases decided after Cort,32 Amtrak'33 and
Barbour'34 have properly expressed conservative views towards
creating new federal rights through the doctrine of implication.
In the Seventh Circuit, for example, the circuit in which the
Guernsey court sits, precedent was explicitly followed in
Goldman v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association.' Ironically, perhaps, precedent led the Goldman court to hold that a
private cause of action did exist to enforce a regulation drawn
pursuant to the Home Owners Loan Act.' Judge (now Justice)
Stevens was uneasy, however, with that aspect of the court's decision. Noting that it is "perhaps arguable" that no private right
ought be implied, he stated: "If the statute expressly authorizes
proceedings to enforce its provisions and the regulations promulgated under it, ordinarily it will be inferred that no other means
of enforcement, such as by private cause of action, was intended
by the legislature."' 37
3 another Seventh Circuit case deMcNamara v. Johnston,"'
131. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 82 (1975). But see Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544 (1969). This case may be distinguished by the fact that the Court dealt with
voting rights in local elections-a situation where prompt action was needed to protect
precious rights.
132. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
133. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974).
134. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
135. 518 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1975).
136. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1970).
137. Goldman v. First Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 518 F.2d 1247, 1250 n.6 (7th Cir. 1975).
The court went on to note that it may be necessary to exhaust administrative remedies
before a private filing would be sustained. Id.
138. 522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975).
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cided since Cort, held that district courts had no original jurisdiction in suits brought to enjoin violations of the Federal Corrupt
Practices Act.'39 In McNamaraindividuals dissatisfied with union
allocation of political funds were directed (as in Cort) to the
administrative agency which had been conferred with primary
jurisdiction for civil enforcement of the statute."' While both the
legislative history and statutory language of the 1974 Campaign
Act amendments appear less ambiguous than they do in the Federal Trade Commission Act on this issue, the discrepancy may
only reflect a sense of Congressional caution derived from judicial
expansion of federal rights rather than a Congressional desire to
create rights in one instance and to deny them in another.
Another recent Seventh Circuit decision, McDaniel v. University of Chicago,'4' found a private cause of action arising under
the Davis-Bacon Act. 42 The circuit court's decision, however,
was vacated by the Supreme Court in a memorandum opinion
which called the court's attention to Barbourand Cort. A fourth
case, Schreiber v. Lugar,4 3 found it unnecessary to decide
whether an implied cause of action may be found under the Revenue Sharing Act, but allowed that "a strong contrary argument
4
can be made.'"
The Third Circuit's contribution to the new trend, Polansky
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.," 5 denied private causes of action
under both 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) and section 1381 to plaintiffs who
asserted that fraudulent representations induced them to participate in a substandard European tour. While private rights had
previously been inferred from the Federal Aviation Act,' the
Third Circuit applied Cort criteria to ascertain whether the particular type of disadvantage suffered was cognizable. Reasoning
that 49 U.S.C. § 1374 only protects passengers from discriminatory access to air facilities, that the remedy sought would not aid
the statutory goal of freedom of transit and that state remedies
for breach of contract, breach of warranty and fraudulent misrepresentation were readily available, the court determined that
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
1956).

18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970).
McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1162 n.5 (7th Cir. 1975).
512 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1975).
40 U.S.C. § 276a (1970).
518 F.2d 1099 (7th Cir. 1975). The case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction,
Id. at 1104 n.16.
523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975).
See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.
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plaintiffs had failed three of the four Cort tests.
The court's analysis of implied private rights under 49
U.S.C. § 1381 is perhaps even more instructive, as that section
authorizes the Civil Aeronautics Board to investigate firms engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition and to issue cease and desist orders in those instances
where the Board disapproves of the method of operation. Significantly, section 1381 was modeled after section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. This heritage was discussed in Pan
American Airways, Inc. v. United States,'4 7 where the Supreme
Court concluded that neither section "embrace[s] a remedy for
private wrongs."'' 8 The circuit court in Polansky, following the
earlier Supreme Court language, concluded that "[t]o vindicate
a public right, Congress created a specialized agency, the Civil
Aeronautics Board. This agency, alone, is provided with enforcement powers under § 1381."'' l
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lopez v. Arrowhead
Ranches"' followed that part of the Cort holding which refused
to find private rights derived from a general penal statute. Thus,
each circuit court which has considered an implication issue since
the Cort decision has either begrudgingly followed precedent, rejected the contention that an implied right of action exists or has
been asked by the Supreme Court to reconsider its holding in
light of the new criteria.
District courts have appeared less niggardly in their treatment of implied claims. For example, the court in Sierra Club v.
Morton"' acknowledged a private right of action under sections 9
and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,151 a statute which
specifically directs the Attorney General to enforce its provisions.
Although the district court followed a Ninth Circuit pre-Cort
decision, '.3 it nevertheless applied the Cort criteria in reaching its
determination. The Sierra court found that the Rivers and Harbors Act was derived for plaintiffs' especial benefit, that there
147. 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
148. Id. at 306.
149. Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 340 (3d Cir. 1975).
150. 523 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1975).
151. 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
152. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1970). This same statute had previously provided the
basis for implying additional judicial remedies in favor of the United States. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
153. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (citing Alameda
Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087, 1094-95 (9th Cir. 1971)).
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was nothing in the Act's history to preclude private rights, and
that the Act contained no grant of exclusive jurisdiction.
Moreover, the court concluded that there was a compelling need
to vindicate the federal interest in preserving navigable waterways in the face of a doubtful state law remedy, and that the
Attorney General's limited resources were insufficient to redress
all private injuries.
In re ParisAir Crash of March 3, 1974, 154 and Rauch v. United
Instruments,.Inc.,'-" following precedent,' 6 found private rights
for enforcing aeronautical wrongful death and economic injury
claims, respectively. Paris and Rauch, however, like Sierra
Club1 7 but unlike Guernsey, operate in areas of pervasive federal
regulation with expressed judicial doubts as to whether any state
remedies are potentially available.
Vasquez v. Ferre,58 a final post-Cort case granting private
rights, closely followed precedent'59 in sustaining a cause of action
under the Wagner-Peyser Act,' a statute which had created a
federal employment service to match workers in one state with
jobs elsewhere. Here the court found that the statutory remedies
created by Congress, as opposed to the way in which they were
administered by the agency, were inadequate.
Two recent cases in the District of Columbia have also followed Cort's reasoning but have denied private rights. In Nader
v. Butz'' the court refused jurisdiction and directed America's
foremost consumer advocate to bring his case before the Federal
Elections Commission which, in the court's opinion, had primary
jurisdiction over complaints seeking injunctive relief against persons or committees believed to be engaging in illegal conduct. In
Network Project v. Corporationfor Public Broadcasting,' the
court refused to imply a private right of action under sections 396
and 398 of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967.163 Although the
statute and its history evidenced an intent to benefit television
154. 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
155. 405 F. Supp. 435, modified, 405 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
156. See, e.g., Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
157. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
158. 404 F. Supp. 815 (D.N.J. 1975).
159. Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969); Galindo
v. Del Monte Corp., 382 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
160. 29 U.S.C. § 49. (1970).
161. 398 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1975).
162. 398 F. Supp. 1332 (D.D.C. 1975).
163. 47 U.S.C. §§ 396-399 (1970).
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viewers, the court cautioned that "[i]n determining whether an
alleged implied right of action exists in this case it is important
to keep in mind not only what Congress sought to accomplish but
the means they provided to accomplish their declared purposes."' 64 Finding a congressional purpose to provide maximum
assistance to noncommercial broadcasting and no evidence of intention to provide private remedies for dissident viewers, no private right was held to exist, in part because "it would inevitably
enmesh the courts in supervision of the detailed day to day operations of [the Corporation for Public Broadcasting].""'5
Other recent lower court opinions rejecting implied rights
include Moen v. Las Vegas InternationalHotel 6 and Traylor v.
Safeway Stores, Inc. 67 In Moen the court refused to imply a private right of action from a misdemeanor penalty statute prohibiting the confiscation of employee gratuities. The court observed
that the Act at issue 66 was passed to protect the general public,
its history implicitly demonstrated an intent to deny private
causes of action, and private enforcement would be inconsistent
with its purpose of denying to employers the benefit of such largesse; it, therefore, granted summary judgment. In Traylor the
court found that the right which the plaintiffs sought to create
(damages for breach of an Executive Order establishing requirements for nondiscriminatory employment opportunities) was disruptive of an administrative scheme and the regulations promulgated thereunder. It noted that "the numbers of potential claims
involved here are astronomical,"' 69 and explained that "[tihe
existence of a private cause of action under the executive order
would vastly complicate the administrative process contemplated
by the order, and would impose a potentially immense burden on
the federal court system."'7 0
Finally, Jones v. United States 7' denied plaintiff's attempt
to bring a civil action for jury tampering under 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b) on the grounds that he was not within the especial class
for whose protection the statute was enacted, and that the pur164. Network Project v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, 398 F. Supp. 1332, 1338
(D.D.C. 1975).
165. Id. at 1339.
166. 402 F. Supp. 157 (D.Nev. 1975).
167. 402 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
168. NEv. REv. STAT. § 608.160 (1971).
169. Moen v. Las Vegas Int'l Hotel, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871, 876 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
170. Id.
171. 401 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. Ark. 1975).
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poses of the Act could be fulfilled by invoking plaintiff's constitutional right to a fair trial. Criminal penalties associated with the
statute were thought to be sufficient to protect the fair administration of justice.
Thus, with the exception of Guernsey, administration of the
implication doctrine since Cort has reflected a rather pronounced
disinclination toward the creation of new federal rights. Indeed,
those district courts which have sustained private .rights explicitly followed precedent in areas traditionally governed by federal
regulation, regardless of whether state remedies were available by
law to aggrieved plaintiffs.
THE GUERNSEY COURT'S "FIFTH" CRITERION

Recent Supreme Court decisions such as Amtrak,'
7 3 and Cort,1
7 4 and lower court decisions which have
Barbour'
adopted their reasoning, have abridged the doctrine of implication with the result that federal penal and regulatory statutes are
not routinely construed to create rights of federal redress for private injuries. These decisions were ignored by the Guernsey court
principally, it seems, because of its distaste for the way in which
the Trade Commission has managed its affairs. Indeed, the
Guernsey opinion is permeated with observations regarding the
problems the agency has investigating consumer complaints. The
opinion also questions the efficacy of the agency to deter consumer fraud, the value of cease and desist orders and the "ponderous administrative processes' ' 7 employed by the agency to
prosecute and adjudicate violations. 71 Concern for the ways in
which the Commission does business is nearly as old as the Commission itself; nevertheless, more violence is done by sharing enforcement of the Act with private parties than with straightforward congressional reform of the Commission.
From the outset, controversy has followed the Trade Commission in its attempts to regulate business practices. In FTC v.
172. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974).
173. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
174. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
175. Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582, 588 (1976).
176. The specific criticism that "[tihe Federal Trade Commission currently receives
about 9,000 complaints a year and is only able to investigate one out of eight or nine of
these, and, of the small fraction investigated, only one in ten results in a cease and desist
order" presupposes the meritorious nature of each complaint. Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408
F. Supp. 582, 586 (1976). Additionally, that statistic is irrelevant to the Guernsey
situation since not every inquiry relates to the enforcement of prior decrees.
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Gratz,'" Justice Brandeis recounted the original debate in Congress between those who wanted a purely investigatory agency
and others who wanted a commission which could prohibit unfair
practices so as to eliminate monopolistic conduct before it had an
opportunity to achieve its intended purposes. While the Interstate Commerce Commission was created to cure only one particular type of unreasonable competition (shipping rebates), the
Federal Trade Commission was burdened with the responsibility
for every other type of practice potentially available to the unfair
trader. Congress, aware that the nature of unfair trade practices
could change with time, deliberately left the Act's definition of
unfair practices vague so that the creative deceiver could be
brought to justice.7 This, of course, created problems for those
charged with enforcement responsibilities, especially since appellate benches often second guessed the Commission's expert judgments.'79
However well intentioned the Congress, problems arose almost immediately regarding the scope of section 5. In FTC v.
Gratz,,80 the Supreme Court dismissed the suit because the Commission did not properly frame its pleading.' 1 Later, in L.B. Silver Co. v. FTC, 2 a majority of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit agreed with certain aspects of the Commission's resolution of the controversy at issue,' 3 but it was nevertheless forced
to acknowledge that "this controversy does not vitally concern
the general purchasing public. On the contrary, it is a controversy
largely between rival breeders of hogs . . .,,
The dissent went further and thought a thorough review of
the Commission's power under section 5 was in order, particularly
since the Commission was proceeding against unfair methods of
85
competition having little to do with restraints and monopolies.'
A careful review of the CongressionalRecord led Judge Denison
177. See text accompanying notes 87-91 supra.
178. See text accompanying notes 87-98 supra.

179. C.

MCFARLAND,

supra note 94, at 92-99.

180. 253 U.S. 421 (1922).
181. Id. Additional early cases which consider section 5 are reviewed in L. B. Silver
Co. v. FTC, 289 F. 985 (6th Cir. 1923).
182. 289 F. 985 (6th Cir. 1923).
183. The Commission was asked to determine whether Ohio-improved Chester hogs
were falsely proffered as superior to the improved Chester White strain.
184. 289 F. 985, 989 (6th Cir. 1923).
185. The 1938 Wheeler-Lea amendments remove all doubt that the Commission
ought proceed against unfair methods of competition which do not involve competitive
injury.
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to conclude that the Commission should be free of private quarrels and controversies and should not act in those matters which,
although perhaps unfair to competitors, do not detrimentally affect the public.' 6 In New Jersey Asbestos Co. v. FTC,'7 the case
was dismissed because the practice involved (commercial bribery) was not a matter of public interest; and in Kinney-Rome Co.
8 the Commission's order, which prohibited a manufacv. FTC'1
turer from giving necktie sets to employees of retail merchants on
completion of a successful sale, was struck down simply because
the court felt that the practice did not amount to unfair competition.
Thus, from the outset, the parameters of the vast responsibilities given to the Commission have been the subject of heated
debate. Further, as recounted by the court in Guernsey, a variety
of courts and critics have taken up arms against Commission
inefficiencies through the years. Criticism continues to this day.' 9
It should also be noted that a new group of critics has
emerged in recent years which has challenged innovative Commission interpretations of its responsibilities. This group takes
issue with the Commission's power to order "corrective" advertising,'90 consumer rescission,' 9 ' substantive trade regulation rules,'92
289 F. 985 (6th Cir. 1923) (Denison, J., dissenting).
264 F. 509 (2d Cir. 1920).
275 F. 665 (7th Cir. 1921).
See, e.g., Ash Grove Cement Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
20,956 (FTC 1975).
I will be departing from this agency soon. If I leave no other legacy here, I
hope at least one idea I have advocated will survive, the notion that real economic benefits to the consumer, not legal indignation, will ultimately become
the touchstone of our case-selection process. An antitrust case that doesn's
[sic] promise lower consumer prices, as I have had occasion to say before, is
like a cow that doesn't give milk and is too stringy to eat.
Id. $ 20,956, at 20,811. See also Memorandum from W. Liebeler, [1975] 723 ANnTIUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA); Bristol-Myers Corp., (1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 20,900 (FTC 1975); Gard, supra note 9, at 279.
190. Corrective advertising orders require an advertiser to confess error for certain
claims previously made for his product. While several manufacturers have accepted
corrective advertising provisions as part of consent decrees, Warner-Lambert, Co. [19731976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,066 (FTC 1975), was the first litigated
proceeding in which the Commission imposed such sanction. That order is now on appeal
to the District of Columbia Circuit.
191. See Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 21,056 (FTC 1975). 15 U.S.C.A. § 57 (b) (1976) gives the Commission authority
to proceed against parties violating trade regulation rules or cease and desist orders for
rescission, reformation, refund of money, damages and for other relief in either federal or
state court. While these provisions specifically provide for notice to be given for injured
parties, they do not enlarge remedies available to such persons.
192. National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert,
186.
187.
188.
189.
(CCH)
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"line of business" reporting1 3 and other activities ostensibly designed to promote fair trading. As contrasted with the somewhat
dated criticism cited in Guernsey, the new critics complain of too
much, rather than too little, Commission enforcement.
In addition, it is appropriate to note that the Commission
has recently made extensive efforts to proceed against those who
have violated its cease and desist orders." 4 In contrast to past
awards, the current trend, aided by a recent amendment'95 which
has increased maximum penalties for each violation from five to
ten thousand dollars, is toward substantial fines." 8 Furthermore,
the Commission's Compliance Division insists on detailed reports
demonstrating fidelity to its orders;"17 there is also recent evidence
that the Commission is actively pursuing its new power to proceed against knowing violators of its orders." 8
Other courts have grappled with the plight of injured consumers who are faced with a seemingly unresponsive bureaucracy."' Wherever the equities may lie as between consumer and
producer in specific situations, it does violence to the concept of
separation of administrative and judicial functions for a court to
rule, as the Guernsey court did, that the administrative process
has failed so abysmally that matters must be taken into judicial
hands. The court in Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp."' properly
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974), rev'g 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that the
Commission inherently possessed this power). See Comment, 69 Nw. U.L. REv., supra
note 9, at 476-88. This power has been codified in recent amendments to the Act. 15
U.S.C.A. § 57 (a) (1976).
193. See 754 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-5 (1976), wherein the line of
business reporting program was criticized as both potentially unreliable and dangerous if
reported data does not remain confidential.
194. See 728 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-5 (1975), which reports on the
Commission's investigation to determine compliance with outstanding orders by "Fortune
500" companies.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1) (Supp. V 1975).
196. See United States v. Bestline, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,190 (FTC 1976)
($1,036,000); Fred Meyer, Inc., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,086 (FTC 1976) ($200,000); J. B. Williams Co., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 21,081 (FTC 1976) ($280,000). See also United States v. Ancorp Nat'l
Servs., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ($204,200); United States v. Bostic, 336
F. Supp. 1312 (D.S.C. 1972) ($80,000).
197. RULES OF PRACTICE BEFORE THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 3.61.
198. See Bull. No. 211, TRADE REG. REP. at 2 (1976); 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
9701.03 (1975).
199. E.g., Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (1973).
200. Id.
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refused to take such action; it looked to Congress to alter statutory causes of action rather than to create them without congressional blessing. Congressional attention has turned to the Commission on many occasions, yet its displeasure has never reached
the level of transferring enforcement power to the federal
courts. 0'
CONCLUSION

In analyzing the Guernsey ruling, it is appropriate to estimate the potential benefits to be achieved by establishing a private cause of action under the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Presumably, plaintiffs would hope to establish a body of law
construing the Act so that they would be relieved of proving certain elements necessary to establish common law fraud and deceit. When the Commission proceeds administratively, staff
counsel do not have to prove that representations or practices
were established with the intent to deceive, it is irrelevant
whether the statement or practice could be interpreted as a mere
opinion, and no proof is needed regarding the misleading nature
of the communication or of the fact that anyone had been deceived by or acted in reliance upon the representation. The basis
for these rules originates from the legal fiction that the Commission has developed its own expertise in such matters and that its
prophylactic function should not be hindered by waiting until it
could prove that significant problems had developed within the
marketplace.
It can be questioned whether we need a kind of "no fault"
consumer protection which would enable any litigant to sue for
damages even where an alleged misrepresentation in advertising
is an innocent mistake, where there is no evidence that anyone
was misled and where only a dispute over a low-cost item with
discernible characteristics is involved. Indeed, such causes could
only be economically prosecuted as class actions, about which
there is probably more controversy than there is about the Trade
Commission. 2 With the type of judicial consideration given to
201. Compare Title I of Pub. L. No. 93-637 (Jan. 4, 1975), which specifically gives
consumers the right to sue in federal district court for warranty claims if each individual
claim exceeds the sum of $25 and the matter in controversy exceeds $50,000, with Title
II, which gives the Commission the authority to proceed against knowing violators of the
section 5 orders. The legislative history of Pub. L. No. 93-637 is collected at 4 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7702 (1974).
202. For decisions limiting the availability of class actions, see Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (plaintiff must bear the entire cost of notice to the class);
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the plight of the consumer by the New York City Civil Court in
Star Credit,"I future plaintiffs may well be better advised to press
burdens and expense
common law claims to avoid the procedural
24
that class actions inevitably engender. 1
In broader context, recent Supreme Court decisions narrow
considerably the availability of implied rights from federal regulatory statutes. The Federal Trade Commission Act, repeatedly
amended since 1914 without congressional authorization for private causes of action, seems a poor candidate to serve as the basis
for expansion of that doctrine. Rather, one might expect that
recognition of implied federal rights will be confined to those
areas in which they now exist until such time as the Supreme
Court gives new evidence of liberalizing its requirements.
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 322 (1969) (plaintiff cannot aggregate claims to reach the
$10,000 jurisdictional limit). For other judicial criticism see Kline v. Coldwell, Banker &
Co., 508 F.2d 226, 239 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Hotel Telephone Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th
Cir. 1974). See also Byrnes, Discovery: Its Uses and Abuses-The Defendants'
Perspective,44 ANTITRUST L.J. 14 (1975), where Professor Handler is quoted as describing
class actions as "legalized blackmail"; Hauser, The ClassAction Struggle Continues: The
Problems Eisen Ignored, 44 ANTrrRUST L.J. 75 (1975).
203. Star Credit Corp. v. Ingram, 75 Misc. 2d 299, 347 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Civ. Ct. 1973).
204. See, e.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971).
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